




priorities for the new 
Australian Government  
Executive summary 
Australia faces both challenges and opportunities on the international 
stage. Changes to the global economic and strategic order are forcing 
Australia to rethink many of the assumptions that have traditionally 
underpinned its security and prosperity.  At the same time Australia’s 
elevation to the world’s leading economic and political forums 
provides it with an opportunity to influence this changing world. 
 
The new Australian Government should approach these international 
challenges and opportunities with judicious ambition.  It should 
restore focus and funding to defence policy, re-energise the G20, add 
substance to the Australia-China strategic dialogue, work with 
China in the Pacific Islands region and adopt a measured 
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The Lowy Institute for International Policy is an independent policy think tank.  Its mandate ranges across all 
the dimensions of international policy debate in Australia – economic, political and strategic – and it is not 
limited to a particular geographic region.  Its two core tasks are to: 
 
 produce distinctive research and fresh policy options for Australia’s international policy and to 
contribute to the wider international debate. 
 
 promote discussion of Australia’s role in the world by providing an accessible and high-quality forum 
for discussion of Australian international relations through debates, seminars, lectures, dialogues and 
conferences. 
 
As an independent think tank the Lowy Institute draws on a broad funding base. The Institute currently receives 
grants from Australian and international philanthropic foundations; membership fees and sponsorship from 
private sector and government entities; grants from Australian and international governments; subscriptions and 





























Lowy Institute Analyses are short papers analysing recent international trends and events and their policy 
implications. 
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There are rare moments in the life of every 
government when it is able to set itself some 
priorities on the international stage.  All too 
often, foreign policy-making boils down to 
little more than responses to events and 
reactions to crises.  So in these first days after 
the federal election, the Lowy Institute is taking 
the opportunity to outline five international 
policy priorities for the new Australian 
Government. 
In outlining these priorities, we are mindful of 
the challenges and opportunities Australia faces 
on the international stage. The rise of China 
and changes to the global economic and 
strategic order are forcing Australia to rethink 
many of the assumptions that have traditionally 
underpinned its security and prosperity.  At the 
same time Australia’s elevation to the world’s 
leading economic and political forums, the G20 
and the UN Security Council, provides the 
country with an unprecedented opportunity to 
influence this changing world in ways that will 
help secure Australia’s future. 
The new Australian Government has a choice, 
therefore: get out on the front foot and pursue 
these challenges and opportunities with 
ambition; or adopt a defensive posture and 
hope that the country can duck the economic 
and strategic bouncers that will almost 
inevitably head its way in coming years.  In our 
view, and that of our Lowy Institute colleagues 
writing in the following pages, the new 
government should be ambitious – although 
that ambition should be mixed with good doses 
of humility and realism.  In that vein, the five 
international policy priorities for the new 
Australian Government that we outline here all 
reflect what might be be termed judicious 
ambition.   
Rory Medcalf and James Brown argue that a 
combination of Australia’s broad national 
interests and an increasingly challenging 
strategic environment means that the new 
government must restore focus and funding to 
defence policy.  The new government needs to 
answer some fundamental questions about 
what it wants the Australian Defence Force 
(ADF) to do, and then make a credible 
commitment to fund the capabilities the ADF 
needs to do it.  The US rebalance is also raising 
expectations of Australia in Washington.  
Future calls for alliance contributions are more 
likely to be in Asia, more likely to be strategic, 
and more likely to brush up against key 
national interests than in the past.  The new 
government should take the initiative in 
influencing the future shape of Australia’s 
alliance relationship.   
Mike Callaghan argues that judicious ambition 
will also need to be the hallmark of Australia’s 
stewardship of the G20.  Australia will chair 
the forum in 2014; the Leaders’ Summit in 
Brisbane in November will be the most 
important economic gathering ever held in the 
country.  The new government should re-
energise the G20, a forum that is both central 
to reviving the global economy and one that 
puts Australia at the centre of international 
economic policy-making.  Key Australian 
ministers, including the Prime Minister, will
Overview 
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Overview 
need to commit time and energy to improve the 
way the G20 functions and ensure that its 
agenda is focused and relevant. 
Likewise, Linda Jakobson argues that it is time 
to be ambitious about the Australia-China 
relationship.  The new government needs to 
add substance to Australia's strategic dialogue 
with China agreed between Beijing and 
Canberra this year.  It is an arrangement that 
Beijing has with few other countries, so its 
creation was an impressive achievement.  But it 
will be up to Canberra to put forward ideas to 
ensure the new partnership does not end up a 
hollow one. 
Jenny Hayward-Jones and Philippa Brant 
contribute a further specific proposal to the 
idea of adding substance to the Australia-China 
relationship.  They argue that Australia should 
work with China in the Pacific Islands and add 
this to the agenda of the strategic dialogue as 
well.  Rather than seeing China’s rising aid 
funding to the region as a threat to Australian 
leadership, Australia should be comfortable 
enough in its own position to work with China 
– including to mitigate some of the problems 
caused by Chinese aid activities in the region. 
Finally, Khalid Koser makes an argument that 
emphasises judiciousness over ambition in 
urging the new Australian Government to 
adopt a measured and sustainable approach to 
people-smuggling.  He proposes five guidelines 
for the new government as it implements its key 
election promise to ‘stop the boats’.  He argues 
that by managing public expectations, 
developing evidence-based policy, promoting 
effective consultation with key stakeholders, 
cooperating regionally and globally, and 
underlining domestically the importance of 
immigration to Australia, the new government 
can ensure that its new policy will prove more 
successful and durable than its predecessor’s.  
 
In this period at the beginning of its term of 
office when a government’s energy and 
ambition should be at its highest levels, we 
would urge the new Australian Government to 
take the initiative and grasp the key challenges 
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Australia’s expansive national interests and an 
increasingly challenging strategic environment 
in Indo-Pacific Asia make it essential to 
modernise the Australian Defence Force (ADF). 
Yet as things stand, the nation’s defence 
capabilities remain underfunded.  The new 
Australian Government needs to restore 
funding, articulate a coherent defence strategy 
and do some deep thinking about its alliance 
relationship with the United States. 
Australia’s interests extend well beyond the 
safety of its citizens and the protection of its 
vast territory.  Its prosperity and security 
depend on seaborne exports, global flows of 
finance, information and people, a rules-based 
international order, the strategic choices of its 
US ally, and stability among powerful nations 
in Asia.  
Yet the strategic environment in which 
Australia must protect or advance those 
interests is changing and becoming more 
uncertain.  With China’s rise, the future of the 
Asian strategic order is in question.  Economic 
and political dysfunction is worsening across 
many countries, combining with nationalism, 
resource pressures, territorial disputes, military 
modernisation and strategic mistrust to increase 
tensions and unpredictability.  
America is striving to reaffirm its commitment 
to regional security, as underlined by President 
Obama’s declared ‘rebalance’ to Asia.  But this 
will also impose new demands on Australia.  
Although a major conflict between the United 
States and China is very unlikely, it would have 
an extremely high impact on Australian 
interests even if this country tried to avoid 
direct involvement. 
There is always a risk that maritime tensions 
between China and Japan or China and the 
Philippines could escalate, placing great 
pressure on the United States to assist either of 
its allies.  In turn, Washington might seek 
Australian help.  It is difficult to imagine an 
Australian government saying no to an 
American request for military support in these 
and other scenarios, such as incidents on the 
Korean peninsula. 
Australia also faces an enduring range of 
challenges below the level of regional conflict.  
The South Pacific and East Timor will remain 
prone to severe governance problems, resource 
and population pressures and natural disasters.  
Australia would almost certainly be called on 
again to lead humanitarian or stabilisation 
activities in our region.  Most missions would 
be small, although there remains a remote 
possibility that Australia would be required to 
restore order in Papua New Guinea, something 
that would be beyond the current capabilities 
of the ADF. 
Against this background, current Australian 
defence policy and funding levels are 
inadequate.  Australian defence policy has long 
assumed a technology edge over other militaries 
in our region.  But many, including China, are 
now modernising their forces faster than we 
are.  So Australia must spend more than usual 
to raise its levels of capability, or accept the 
loss of its strategic edge.  Each year the latest 
defence equipment becomes more complex and 
Restore focus and funding to 
defence policy 
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Restore focus and funding to defence policy 
expensive, so deferring modernisation to save 
money in the short term makes it more costly in 
the end. 
The ADF is still feeling the effect of a 10.5 per 
cent budget cut in 2012.  Such short-term 
savings could cause irreversible decline to 
capabilities, leaving them unable to be 
regenerated within reasonable warning times 
for any future crisis.  Already, some capabilities 
have been effectively mothballed; others are at 
low levels of readiness.The Army has told 
government that without augmentation it 
would not be able to sustain concurrent 
deployments.  And structural and sustainment 
issues, such as the paucity of naval engineering 
capability and underdeveloped national defence 
infrastructure, are jeopardising current 
capability and future modernisation plans.   
The force structure proposed by the 2009 and 
2013 Defence White Papers has commanded 
broad political support as a vision for a 
modernised Australian Defence Force. But 
deferral and underfunding are turning it into a 
mirage.  Most security experts deem that force 
to be unachievable on present budget trends 
and projections.  According to one estimate, up 
to $33 billion beyond current defence budget 
projections would need to be found to fund it 
over the next 10 years.  
What should the new Australian Government 
do? 
The new government needs to do three things: 
work out what it wants the ADF to do; work 
out how to pay for it; and do some deep 
thinking about what our alliance relationship 
with the United States will demand of Australia 
in future. 
To modernise the ADF, spending would need 
to increase substantially from its current 
historically low level of 1.59 per cent of GDP.  
More important than current campaign 
promises by both parties to eventually return 
spending to 2 per cent of GDP on defence is the 
need to begin funding increases in the near-
term, while planning for the next decade and 
beyond. 
To reach these levels of funding, foreseeable 
budgetary circumstances would have to change, 
or the government would need to reallocate 
spending from other portfolios.  This is a 
matter of political choice.  The problem is that 
Australian governments typically prioritise 
defence spending only in response to crisis, 
while what is really required is a sustained 
long-term increase in funding.  In fact, a 
credible future military may cost more than 2 
per cent of GDP.  
But before the government can be sure how 
much military spending is the answer, it first 
needs to ask itself what it expects the ADF to 
do.  Currently too much of Australia’s thinking 
on military strategy is left to military planners 
without clear political direction about why, 
where and when government would want the 
option of using military force. 
This silence is loudest when it comes to 
maritime strategy.  The next-generation 
military that the last two defence white papers 
have envisaged for Australia is principally 
maritime, ranging from long-term plans for a 
fleet of 12 submarines to the current fitting-out 
of two huge amphibious assault ships that will 
embark specialised Army units.  The 
fundamental questions about these capabilities 
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Restore focus and funding to defence policy 
are strategic: what do we want them to do, 
where, and why?  
The promised new defence white paper needs 
to be a first principles review, rather than 
automatically defaulting to a modest 
adjustment based on inherited capability 
choices and politically pre-determined budget 
constraints.  It should consider all options for 
the ADF, including those that might now seem 
radical and imaginative such as a much larger 
investment in unmanned systems. It should 
critically assess whether the basic structure of 
the ADF (essentially unchanged since the 
Menzies era) remains the right one. Its 
conclusions on force posture and capability 
should be publicly justified against other 
alternatives.  It should incorporate thorough 
independent analysis, in a similar fashion to the 
US Quadrennial Defense Review. 
Second, the government needs a long-term 
defence capability and budget plan committing 
the additional funds necessary to pay for a 
credible force structure. This would involve 
steadily increasing overall defence expenditure 
as well as providing for 3 per cent annual real 
growth in the defence budget just to sustain 
current military capability.  
Without this kind of investment, the 
government would be forced to make some 
controversial and risky cuts to defence.  These 
could involve, inter alia: reducing large 
numbers of senior positions in the Australian 
Defence Organisation or instituting an across-
the-board pay freeze for a year or more; 
reducing the size of the Army’s future 
armoured vehicle fleet, increasing risk to 
deployed troops; reducing the future submarine 
fleet; or cutting back the size of the future Joint 
Strike Fighter fleet and flying hours for pilots, a 
decision that would be out of step with regional 
trends. 
Third, the new government should also do 
some deep thinking about Australia’s alliance 
relationship with the United States.  The 
alliance brings irreplaceable benefits to 
Australia including access to strategic 
deliberations, exceptional intelligence, 
advanced military technology and, most 
important of all, security guarantees.  But 
change in Asia will re-shape the alliance.  
Australia’s future alliance contributions will be 
more strategic than tactical, and will brush 
against direct strategic and economic interests.  
The new government should take the initiative 
in influencing the future shape of the alliance. 
In this the government must comprehend two 
dynamics.  The first is deepening military 
integration, involving the presence of US assets 
in Australia and the placement of senior 
Australian personnel in US commands.  Here 
policy should be driven by political leadership, 
rather than emerging from the momentum of 
existing military connections and staff 
planning.  The second dynamic relates to 
expectations on Australia as a force contributor 
as the United States rebalances its military and 
diplomatic posture to Asia, and looks for allies 
to share more of the regional burden. 
There is much Australia can contribute to the 
alliance: leadership in the South Pacific; 
maritime situational awareness; alternative 
channels of engagement with China and 
Indonesia; intelligence and planning; counsel in 
crisis. But effectiveness in these roles requires 
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Restore focus and funding to defence policy 
credible military capabilities of our own, 
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Australia will be the chair of the G20 in 2014.  
The Leaders’ Summit in Brisbane in November 
will be the most important economic gathering 
ever held in Australia. There are high 
expectations that Australia will be instrumental 
in re-energising the G20 as the premier forum 
for international economic cooperation.  To do 
that, Australia will need to both improve the 
way that the G20 does its work and define a 
focused and relevant agenda for the forum. 
It is important that Australia’s chairing of the 
G20 is a success.  Not only for national pride, 
but because global economic prospects, and in 
turn Australia’s economic fortunes, will be 
improved with an effective G20.  The world 
economy is no less integrated than it was in 
2008, when the G20 rallied to prevent the 
global financial and economic crisis from 
leading to a global depression.  There has been 
no reduction in the potential for events in and 
policies of one country spilling over and 
seriously impacting other countries.  The world 
needs an effective forum for international 
economic cooperation.  
Moreover, it is not pre-ordained that the G20 
will always be the key global forum for dealing 
with pressing global economic issues.  In fact, 
there is a widespread view that the effectiveness 
of the G20 is waning.  The G20’s current role 
could be usurped by another forum that does 
not include Australia as a member, such as an 
expanded G8.  If this happens Australia would 
lose the ability to shape global economic 
decisions critical to our future prosperity. 
Broadly, Australia needs to achieve three 
objectives in relation to the G20.  First, all G20 
leaders need to come to the Brisbane Summit.  
It would be embarrassing for the government, 
and damaging to the future of the G20, if key 
leaders did not attend.  But if leaders start to 
lose interest in the G20, some may not come to 
Brisbane.  A long trip to Australia eats into the 
time of world leaders.  Second, Australia’s 
approach to the organising and chairing of the 
G20 must set a new high benchmark for future 
chairs, which would help re-energise the G20.  
Third, and most importantly, the Brisbane 
Summit must achieve some tangible outcomes 
that strengthen the global economy. 
What should the new Australian Government 
do? 
Australia should release a concept paper in 
early December 2013, immediately after it 
assumes the chair, outlining its approach to 
chairing the G20 in 2014.  The message should 
be that things will be different.  The G20 
process will be targeted, streamlined, pragmatic 
and most importantly, results-oriented.  
Priority will be given to improving 
communication, particularly in outlining how 
the activities of the G20 are inter-related and 
aimed at improving people’s lives.  
Communication from recent G20 summits has 
been poor, in part reflecting the absence of 
significant outcomes to report.  There should 
be a short leaders’ declaration from the 
Brisbane Summit that covers the main 
achievements, rather than a very long 
communiqué.  Progress reports on other issues 
should be released separately.  Australia should 
emphasise that there will be greater 
transparency and further efforts to improve 
G20 accountability in 2014. 
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Re-energise the G20 
As early as possible the Prime Minister should 
make personal contact with G20 leaders and 
outline Australia’s approach to the G20.  Good 
personal relations with leaders will be vital to 
achieving progress on difficult subjects.  The 
Prime Minister should use his attendance at the 
APEC Summit in Indonesia on 7-8 October 
2013 and the East Asia Summit in Brunei 
Darussalam on 9-10 October 2013 to discuss 
Australia’s approach to the Brisbane G20 
Summit with other leaders. 
The government should appoint a 
parliamentary secretary for the G20. This 
individual would be the personal representative 
of the G20 leader and would be the chief public 
spokesman for Australia on the G20 in 2014.  
The appointment of a parliamentary secretary 
would underline that the government sees the 
Brisbane Summit as a priority.  
The Prime Minister would need to quickly 
identify the priorities for the G20 in 2014.  The 
G20’s agenda is currently too long and too 
broad, but member countries object when items 
they have placed on the agenda are dropped.  
Australia should adopt a ‘twin track’ process.  
That is, work would continue on a wide range 
of issues, but leaders would focus on a few key 
areas that would be identified as the ‘headline’ 
agenda items for the Summit.  These would be 
the ‘take-outs’ – the main achievements from 
the Brisbane Summit. 
In selecting the priorities for the Summit, it is 
important that they are ‘owned’ by the Prime 
Minister.  They must be his priorities and not 
those of officials.  If progress is going to be 
made in overcoming some intractable global 
economic problems, this would require the 
personal and committed involvement of the 
Prime Minister.  The Prime Minister would 
have to be actively engaged in negotiations with 
other leaders and would need to convey the 
importance he attaches to these issues. 
Australia has already signaled that its focus 
would be on ‘jobs and growth’.  This is the 
focus of the Russian presidency.  Jobs and 
growth is an appropriate overarching objective, 
but there is no silver bullet solution that would 
quickly restore global growth.  Progress has to 
be made across many fronts, primarily 
involving the domestic policy settings in 
member countries.  While the G20 says that it 
is focusing on promoting growth, the IMF 
continues to revise down its forecasts for the 
global economy.  Australia would need to 
identify specific objectives for the Brisbane 
Summit and show how they would contribute 
to achieving sustainable economic and jobs 
growth. 
One key priority should be trade.  The G20 
should be worried about the future of the 
international global trading system after the 
failure of the Doha round and the trend 
towards mega-regional, and discriminatory, 
trade deals.  The Brisbane Summit should begin 
a process of resurrecting the multilateral 
trading system and the WTO in a post-Doha 
world.  Trade is critical to delivering economic 
and jobs growth. 
Another priority should be climate change.  
The G20 cannot do the work of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC). But it could provide 
momentum for achieving a deal at the next 
UNFCCC conference in 2015.  Specifically, the 
G20 could focus on the issue of climate change 
financing.  At the Copenhagen and Cancun 
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Re-energise the G20 
climate change summits, there was a 
commitment to mobilise US$100 billion per 
year to help developing countries with 
adaptation and mitigation.  While 
consideration of the options for raising this 
money has been on the G20 agenda for some 
time, it has not been seriously addressed.  
Officials are defensive and unwilling to advance 
the issue.  It will require political involvement 
to make any progress.  This is a role the G20 
should play.  If leaders could give serious 
consideration to the issue of climate change 
financing in 2014, it would build momentum 
toward 2015.  
Priority should also be given to revitalising the 
G20 finance ministers’ process.  Organisational 
changes are required to generate improved 
discussions between ministers, with fewer 
reports from international organisations.  G20 
finance ministers and central bank governors 
have to comprehensively address all the policies 
necessary to restore growth, including 
structural reforms, rather than engage in a 
selective consideration of issues.  Australia 
should focus on financial regulation and 
prevent the G20 from becoming little more 
than a rubber stamp for the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB).  Financial regulation requires 
more dedicated oversight by the G20 ministers.  
The G20 should examine the cumulative effect 
of the regulatory changes, the possibility of 
unintended consequences and the overall 
impact on stability and growth. 
Finally, Australia must maintain momentum in 
combatting tax avoidance through corporate 
base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS).  This 
was one of the main achievements of the St 
Petersburg G20 Leaders’ Summit.  Now that 
the ball has been passed to Australia, Canberra 
must not drop it.  Australia would have to 
demonstrate tangible progress in 2014, but 
expectations would also need to be managed, 
for this is a complex and contentious issue 
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The new Australian Government should make 
use of Australia's recently established strategic 
partnership with China to promote free trade, 
enhance defence cooperation, and discuss a 
bilateral investment treaty. Now is the time to 
be ambitious. 
The decision in April 2013, by the Chinese 
Government, to establish a strategic 
partnership with Australia and agree to an 
annual, high-level dialogue with Canberra on 
political, economic and military affairs was a 
major milestone in Australia-China relations.  
But a consultation framework is only a useful 
tool.  Left unused, any partnership, let alone a 
strategic one, will be hollow.  
China's and Australia's senior leaders now have 
a regular forum not only to discuss bilateral 
affairs but also regional and global issues.  
China has committed its senior leaders to this 
type of arrangement with very few countries.  It 
raises Australia's relationship with China to a 
new level; Canberra should use this to its 
advantage. 
What should the new Australian Government 
do? 
Beijing is committed to the dialogue, but it will 
be very much up to Canberra to put forward 
ideas that give it substance.  The new 
government needs to identify initiatives that 
stand apart from the long list of routine 
bilateral issues.  One goal should be to raise 
Australia's profile as a regional player in the 
eyes of Beijing' leaders.   The following are 
three specific ideas that should be considered.  
Two regional initiatives should be top priorities 
in Canberra's discussions with Beijing.  First, as 
the 2014 chair of the G20 and a nation reliant 
on free trade, Australia should urgently explore 
China's willingness to publish a joint statement 
supporting global trade agreements.*  Next 
year China takes on the chairmanship of the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 
which was founded, in part, to promote free 
trade. Even a generally-worded statement from 
the upcoming G20 and APEC chairs – a 
developed economy and an emerging economy 
– about the need to restart global free trade 
negotiations would send a strong signal to 
counter protectionist inclinations. 
Agreement on the wording of such a statement 
would require Australian and Chinese officials 
at all levels to work together.  This would 
increase familiarity between officials, which in 
turn could lay the foundation for future joint 
initiatives.  It is in Australia's interest to be 
perceived by China as a partner of choice when 
it comes to discussing regional and global 
problems.  
Second, Canberra should establish a major 
regional training centre for humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief (HADR) in 
Darwin and invite China to be an active 
participant in it.  Canberra could use the 
Australia-China dialogue to explain its 
intentions and win Beijing's support for such an 
initiative.  A state-of-the-art HADR centre 
would both raise Australia's profile as a 
regional player and encourage China to 
increase its defence cooperation with the 
region.
Add substance to Australia’s 
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Add substance to Australia's strategic dialogue with China 
 
Defence cooperation between China and 
Australia has come a long way since the first 
port call in China by three Royal Australian 
Navy (RAN) ships 16 years ago.  The Chiefs 
(or Deputy Chiefs) of Staff meet regularly, the 
People's Liberation Army (PLA) and Australian 
Defence Force have conducted half-a-dozen 
joint exercises, and the RAN has paid more 
than 10 port visits to mainland China.  
However, there is little depth and substance to 
defence cooperation.  Genuine interaction 
between the defence forces and time spent 
working side-by-side has been minimal.  The 
more the Australian defence forces – and others 
– understand how the PLA operates, the less 
risk there is for misunderstanding (and 
miscalculation). 
Providing China, Indonesia and other regional 
actors with an opportunity to train alongside 
the United States at a first-class HADR centre 
would take Australia-China defence ties to a 
new level.  Senior ADF officers endorse the 
idea; in private conversations they note that 
there is a strong probability that ADF and PLA 
soldiers will work side-by-side when a natural 
disaster next strikes in the region. 
The United States would also support such an 
initiative.  Last month three Chinese navy ships 
joined search-and-rescue drills with the United 
States in the waters off Hawaii.  Afterward, the 
ships continued on to Australia and New 
Zealand for similar exercises.  The US and 
Chinese militaries are exchanging military 
officers for academic studies and holding talks 
on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. 
In 2014, at the invitation of the United States 
Pacific Command, China's navy will participate 
for the first time in a major international 
maritime exercise, Rim of the Pacific. 
Darwin would be an obvious location for a 
regional HADR centre. Darwin – and the 
decision to base US Marines there – needs to be 
de-mystified in the minds of Chinese strategic 
thinkers.  Inviting the Chinese to Darwin to 
take part in multilateral HADR training 
exercises and for high-level political meetings 
could help achieve this.  Darwin has become 
shorthand in China for concerns about 
Australia’s role in the US rebalancing strategy.   
The third initiative to be put on the agenda of 
the strategic dialogue between Canberra and 
Beijing would be the negotiation of a bilateral 
investment treaty (BIT).  Canberra should 
utilise its close relations with the United States 
to learn the ins and outs of the BIT negotiations 
currently being conducted between Beijing and 
Washington, and then follow in Washington's 
footsteps. 
China and the United States announced their 
intention to negotiate a high-level BIT 
following talks in July 2013 at the US-China 
Strategic and Economic Dialogue.  China has 
pledged to negotiate a BIT that would include 
all stages of investment and all sectors based on 
a 'negative list' approach.  This approach 
would identify sectors that are not open to 
foreign investment.  It would replace China's 
current practice of listing some sectors that are 
open to foreign investment, but leaving 
uncertainty about others.  China’s move has 
been described by US officials as 'a significant 
breakthrough, and the first time China has 
agreed to do so with another country'. 
There are several indications that China, after 
years of dragging its feet, is ready to cooperate 
on a host of free trade and investment issues.  
For example, China has announced plans to 
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establish a pilot Free Trade Zone program in 
Shanghai, allowing foreign enterprises to 
compete on the same terms as Chinese firms 
across a wide range of service sectors. 
Australia needs to move swiftly and be the 
second in line after the United States, prepared 
to move forward with detailed negotiations.  
Australia will not be the only country that 
would want to follow in the wake of a 
successful American agreement.  There would 
be lucrative investment projects waiting, if 
China does indeed modify its stance toward 
foreign direct investment. 
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Australia’s ability to shape developments in the 
Pacific Islands is being challenged by a growing 
number of new donor countries active in the 
region, chief amongst them China.  Whilst 
there is little prospect that China will supplant 
Australia’s development role or trade and 
investment links in the region any time soon, 
some Pacific governments are using China’s 
generosity to reduce Australia’s influence in the 
region.  The solution is not to block China in 
the Pacific Islands, but to work with it. 
The Pacific is Australia’s front yard.  Australia 
spends billions of aid dollars in the Pacific 
Islands.  It is the region’s leading partner by a 
considerable margin in trade, investment, aid 
and defence.  But Australia should also feel 
comfortable enough in its own position to 
work with emerging players such as China. 
In purely financial terms, China is still a long 
way behind Australia as a donor in the Pacific.  
Australian aid for the period of 2006 to 2011 
totalled US$4.8 billion, more than five times 
China’s aid contribution to the Pacific Islands 
over the same period.  Pacific governments are 
courting Chinese aid and investment as a way 
to assert greater independence from traditional 
donors such as Australia.  At the extreme end 
of the spectrum, for example, Fiji is actively 
procuring Chinese support for sub-regional 
organisations, such as the Melanesian 
Spearhead Group and the new Pacific Islands 
Development Forum, to erode Australia’s 
influence in the region. 
Australia seems prepared to work with China, 
but is also wary of it.  During the visit of then 
Chinese vice-premier Li Keqiang to Canberra in 
October 2009, the two countries agreed that 
they shared ‘important common interests in 
promoting peace, stability and development in 
the Asia-Pacific region’.  Australia and China 
signed a Development Cooperation Partnership 
MOU that enables collaboration in the Pacific 
in April 2013.  But the 2013 Defence White 
Paper hinted at official concerns about China’s 
rise in the region.  It referred to the ‘growing 
reach and influence of Asian nations’ as a 
‘challenge’ that might affect Australia’s 
‘contribution’ to the region. 
Such attitudes may reflect a prudent analysis of 
threats and opportunities posed by China in the 
Pacific Islands region.  But expressed publicly 
in this way, they also have the effect of sending 
an unhelpfully mixed message and enable 
Pacific Islands leaders to play on fears of China 
in their demands to Australia for aid with fewer 
strings attached. 
What should the new Australian Government 
do? 
First, the new government should go beyond 
the agreements that have already been signed 
with China on cooperation in the Pacific to give 
them real practical effect.  For example, the 
joint pilot investigation into malaria in Papua 
New Guinea should be extended beyond a mere 
information exchange to become to a project 
that involves real development cooperation. 
Second, the new government should tie its 
cooperation with China in the Pacific Islands 
more firmly to the broader political 
relationship.  It should do this by putting this 
Work with China in the Pacific 
Islands 
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cooperation on the agenda of the new high-
level strategic dialogue between Australia and 
China.  The dialogue would provide a 
mechanism to exchange views on common 
challenges in the region.  Issues like climate 
change, disaster management, food security and 
disease are not only top priorities for Pacific 
Island societies, they are areas in which 
Australia and China have strong interests and 
some common or complementary expertise and 
objectives.  Unlike many traditional security 
issues, discussion of these issues in a Pacific 
Islands context is unlikely to be politically 
sensitive for China given it is a region where so 
few of China’s core interests are engaged – so 
the discussion is likely to be more productive. 
A high-level discussion that reached broad 
agreement on approaches to the region’s major 
challenges would facilitate collaboration in 
specific priority areas.  This could include 
projects on climate change mitigation, the 
development of high-yield crops, efforts to 
prevent the rise of tuberculosis and non-
communicable diseases, and joint defence 
disaster relief responses. 
Cooperation would deliver benefits for 
Australia, for China and ultimately for the 
Pacific Islands as well. 
For Australia, it would reinforce its influence in 
the region, but also promote development.  
There have been negative consequences from 
Chinese development activities.  In some cases 
Chinese aid activities have caused debt distress, 
adverse environmental impacts and social 
tensions.  The relative inexperience of some 
Chinese companies has entangled them in 
domestic political and community disputes.  
Working with China would help mitigate the 
worst of these problems and reduce pressure on 
Australian development activities.  It would 
also send a signal to the region that there is no 
value in playing Australia off China in efforts 
to attract more aid. 
China wants to be seen as a globally 
responsible player.  The Pacific Islands offers 
an easy opportunity to do that.  Parts of the 
bureaucracy in Beijing recognise that they need 
to improve their knowledge of the region.  
Chinese aid activities have already caused 
resentment in many Pacific Island countries.  
There is always potential for community 
resentment to spill over into the kind of anti-
Chinese sentiment that gave rise to riots, 
damage to Chinese-owned property and threats 
to Chinese expatriates in Solomon Islands and 
Tonga in 2006 and Papua New Guinea in 
2009.  Chinese authorities would be keen to 
avoid any repeats of this scenario.   
If China can demonstrate it is both committed 
to helping the Pacific Islands tackle challenges 
that are already recognised as priorities in 
regional and multilateral forums, and to 
collaborating with the region’s most significant 
partner, this constructive approach would be 
noticed internationally.  That China agreed to 
the Australian MOU on development 
cooperation shows it is willing to consider a 
collaborative approach to addressing 
development challenges in the region.  
High-level agreement between Australia and 
China on approaches to development in the 
Pacific would also give local states greater 
certainty about the commitment of their major 
external donors to core development and 
security challenges.  High-level Australia-China 
discussion of non-traditional security challenges 
in the Pacific could feed into the agenda of the 
annual Pacific Islands Forum Leaders meetings.  
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It would diffuse the tensions that are sometimes 
evident in Forum meetings over the role of 
China in the region.  
In their bilateral relations China and Australia 
will not always agree on every issue, nor should 
they expect to.  There are plenty of issues, 
especially over the strategic future of East Asia, 
where the idea of working with China will 
prove more difficult and sensitive.  It is 
worthwhile, therefore, to look for areas where 
such cooperation is more achievable.  Working 
with China in the Pacific Islands region would 
not simply deliver real benefits to the region, it 
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Ending people-smuggling is a clear policy 
priority for the new Australian Government – 
perhaps the clearest priority it set for itself 
before the election.  But just because it is a 
priority does not mean the problem can be 
solved overnight.  The new Australian 
Government should adopt a set of key 
principles for tackling the issue in a measured, 
sustainable and long-term fashion. 
There are a number of reasons why people-
smuggling should be a priority beyond simply 
the need to control Australia’s borders.  There 
is a humanitarian prerogative to stop desperate 
people dying to get to Australia.  Stopping 
irregular maritime arrivals has also become a 
litmus test for public confidence in the overall 
ability of government to perform its core tasks.  
Moreover, the dramatic growth in the number 
of boats has elevated the issue from a minor 
blemish on an otherwise standard-setting 
migration management program, to one that 
risks undermining the integrity of the program 
altogether.  International migration is in 
Australia’s national interests and Australia’s 
national interests should not be held to ransom 
by people-smugglers. 
It would be a mistake, however, for the new 
government to underestimate the challenge, or 
the time it will take to develop a policy that 
works.  If we have learned nothing else from 
the last few years, it is that this is a complex 
problem that defies easy solutions.  And now 
the election is won, the new government has an 
opportunity to create the breathing-space it 
needs to get it right.  This is the time for 
measured policy-making not knee-jerk political 
posturing. 
What should the new Australian Government 
do? 
The new government already staked out its 
approach towards people-smuggling before the 
election based on an uncompromising promise 
to ‘stop the boats’.  Detailed policy now needs 
to be developed, tested, and costed; an 
appropriate apportionment of staff and 
resources is required; and new policies need to 
be effectively communicated. 
Drawing on lessons learned from the successes 
and failures of government policies in Australia 
over the last decade, as well as the experience 
of international asylum policy, the government 
should adopt the following five guidelines as it 
develops its policy on people-smuggling: 
First, manage expectations and change the 
terms of the debate.  There are too many 
elements of the people-smuggling process that 
are outside the government’s immediate 
influence to allow for confident forecasts about 
reductions in boat arrivals over particular time 
horizons.  Understanding this is the first step 
towards achieving the goal of ending people-
smuggling.  Demonstrating that the government 
understands this is the first step towards 
reassuring the public that it is taking this 
challenge seriously. 
Australians are almost as frustrated with the 
lack of a clear policy on people-smuggling as 
they are with the number of people arriving by 
boat.  The people want – and deserve – 
leadership not lies, fact not fiction, honesty not 
hubris.  Now is the moment to change the tone 
of the debate, and to pose people-smuggling as 
a complex challenge to which there are no 
Adopt a measured and sustainable 
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quick resolutions and which realistically can be 
reduced but not eradicated. 
Many people who arrive in Australia by boat 
should be granted refugee status.  A proportion 
of migrants who come to Australia legally are 
cheating the system.  Some asylum seekers pose 
a threat to Australia’s national security.  A few 
Australians are racist.  Not all people-
smugglers are criminals.  Each of these 
statements risks offence, but each is true.  It 
would be almost impossible to develop sensible 
policy unless such truths are confronted head-
on.  Debate the facts, don’t deny them. 
Second, develop an evidence-base for policy 
and test proposals against domestic and 
international law.  Policy based on surmise or 
developed for political purposes is neither 
credible nor effective.  Basic questions still 
remain unanswered in the Australian context: 
why do asylum seekers risk their lives to come 
to Australia by boat?  What do they know 
about asylum policy, and does policy make any 
difference to their decisions?  How does the 
people-smuggling industry work, and what 
happens in transit countries?  Targeted, policy-
oriented research needs to provide answers to 
the questions as a foundation for proactive 
policies. 
Legal appeals have a tendency to avalanche.  
They disrupt the implementation of policies.  
They provide windows of opportunity to 
people-smugglers and prospects for their 
clients.  Repairing the strained relationship 
between the executive and the judiciary would 
be important for carrying forward the entire 
legislative agenda of the new government, and 
not just on asylum seekers. For all these reasons 
and more, the new government needs to be 
confident that its policy would pass legal tests. 
Third, promote effective consultation.  
Consultation is critical for legitimate and 
effective policy-making, but it need not be a 
box-ticking exercise.  Get on the front foot: 
challenge civil society to support the 
government’s agenda in the national interest; 
hold the private sector to account in respecting 
migrants’ rights; incentivise the research 
community to provide solutions not just 
identify problems.   
Fourth, cooperate regionally and globally.  
People-smuggling is a transnational 
phenomenon that cannot be managed on a 
unilateral basis.  Equally it is too insignificant 
an issue to risk jeopardizing economic or trade 
or other bilateral, regional, or global 
partnerships.  Development assistance should 
aim for grander goals than reducing 
immigration or facilitating returns.  Regional 
neighbours are potential trading partners, not 
just transit countries.  Engage the international 
community to provide a roadmap rather than a 
roadblock. 
People-smuggling is a global scourge, and 
should not be an Australian obsession.  There 
are lessons to learn from approaches adopted 
elsewhere in the world.  Global cooperation 
serves Australian national interests.  Australia 
should contribute to multilateral efforts to stem 
people-smuggling.  The goal of the government 
should not be limited to reducing irregular 
maritime arrivals to Australia; it should be to 
help undermine the global crime of people-
smuggling. 
Finally, make the case for immigration.  It 
would be a fundamental mistake to allow 
irregular maritime arrivals to do further 
damage to the national interests of Australia by 
deterring a strong commitment to continue 
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importing and settling the skills, innovation, 
enterprise, multiculturalism, and demographic 
advantages that immigrants bring to Australia.  
The new government should be a champion of 
immigration.  In the long term this will give the 
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